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INTRODUCTION 
Rose Mary Knick owned a home on a sizeable piece of property in Scott 
Township, Pennsylvania, a few miles outside of Scranton.1  One of her 
neighbors sought permission from the Township to search her land.2  The 
neighbor did some research and concluded that a family member was buried 
on Knick’s land.3  The Township sought access and Knick denied it.4  
Perhaps she did not like them, or perhaps she thought the claim was bogus, 
but no matter how she felt, as the owner of the land, it was her right to tell 
people what they could or could not do on it.  As Knick says, “private 
property is private property.”5 
Knick sought information from the Township on why they thought a 
cemetery existed on her property.6  The Township responded by enacting 
an ordinance which: required all property owners in the Township to 1) keep 
any “cemeteries” open to the “general public,” and 2) accept Township 
officials entering their land to maintain these cemeteries.7  The punishment 
for failure to comply with these terms is a civil fine of between $300 and $600, 
and there is no form of appeal or procedure for establishing the existence of 
 
 *  Thank you to Professor Thomas Witt for your guidance, enthusiasm, and for interesting me in the 
fascinating intersection of land use and constitutional law. 
 1 Knick v. Scott Twp. (Scott Twp. I), No. 3:14-CV-2223, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146861, at *2 (M.D. 
Pa. Oct. 29, 2015). 
 2 Id. at *3. 
 3 Terrie Morgan-Besecker, Pa. Property Owner Sues After Family Seeks Access to Cemetery on Her Land, 
MORNING CALL (Dec. 26, 2014, 5:47 PM), https://www.mcall.com/news/nationworld/
pennsylvania/mc-pa-cemetery-dispute-revolutionary-war-20141226-story.html.  
 4 Id. 
 5 Jason Nark, SCOTUS Will Dig Into Debate Over Alleged Cemetery on Pa. Farm, PHILA. INQUIRER (May 
24, 2018), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/scotus-cemetery-pa-farm-private-property-scott-
township-lackawanna-rose-mary-knick-20180524.html.  
 6 Knick, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146861, at *3–4. 
 7 SCOTT TWP., PA., ORDINANCE 12-12-20-001 art. 5–6 (2012). 
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a cemetery.8  A Township officer entered Knick’s land under this ordinance 
without a warrant and determined that certain stones sitting on the land were 
grave markers.9  Knick was not fined for refusing access to the inspectors or 
the neighbors.  Acting preemptively, Knick sued in state and federal court 
for a declaratory judgment on the ordinance’s unconstitutionality and to 
enjoin its enforcement, claiming that her rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments were violated.10 
Property owners have the right to control access to their property by 
excluding those who have no right to it.  Academics, activists, legislators, and 
judges are in the process of establishing in many places the right to access the 
burial grounds of ancestors to respect the dead and maintain grave sites.  
These rights inevitably conflict.  This issue is not new: both private and public 
parties consistently neglected and abused the graves of minorities and natives 
throughout American history.11  More recently, the wide availability of 
historic information and increase in preservation efforts made possible by the 
Internet Age, combined with increasing development in historical areas, has 
led to a renaissance in the grave-preservation movement.12  When these 
rights interfere with each other, which wins?  Assuming that the right to 
respect the dead is an enforceable right that trumps property rights in certain 
situations, what burden should there be to prove or disprove the existence of 
a grave where no clear markers exist? 
The Supreme Court had to decide this case not on these issues, but on 
the issue of standing.  American courts will need to address the conflict 
between property rights and spiritual dignity which caused the underlying 
dispute.13  The matters of death, burial, and land rights are at the core of 
 
 8 Id. art. 7.  An appeal exists for the limited purpose of challenging the levying of a fine, not for the 
Township’s determination that a cemetery exists. 
 9 Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 862 F.3d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 10 Knick v. Scott Twp. (Scott Twp. II), No. 3:14-CV-02223, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121220, at *4–6 
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2016). 
 11 See, e.g., Christopher A. Amato, Digging Sacred Ground: Burial Site Disturbances and the Loss of New York’s 
Native American Heritage, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 2–4 (2002) (discussing inadvertent and 
intentional destruction of indigenous burial sites in New York); Constance M. Callahan, Comment, 
Warp and Weft: Weaving a Blanket of Protection for Cultural Resources on Private Property, 23 ENVTL. L. 1323, 
1324 (1993) (noting the failure of federal law in protecting cultural resources). 
 12 See Alfred L. Brophy, Grave Matters: The Ancient Rights of the Graveyard, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1469 (2006); 
see also Kate Galbraith, New Homes Confront Old Burial Grounds, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/business/yourmoney/17natreal.html (highlighting the 
issues raised by the discovery of old graves on lands purchased by developers).  
 13 The primary issue decided by the Court was whether to overturn Williamson County’s state litigation 
requirement for ripeness of a takings claim.  Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2168 (2019).  
The test in Williamson County required: 1) a final decision from the state regarding the taking, and 2) 
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American values and rarely conflict in other circumstances.  The case is 
further complicated by the Township’s haphazard venture to decide the 
matter without any processes in place to protect landowners from 
unwarranted claimants.  The district court denied all of Knick’s claims, 
telling her to seek compensation from the state through inverse 
condemnation.14  The Third Circuit affirmed.15  But what would have 
happened if her claims had not been denied?  Scott Township refused Knick 
any means of challenging their decision that a grave exists in the short and 
ill-defined statute.   
This Comment has two goals: to review the right to grave access in the 
context of property rights, and to argue that Knick and other property 
owners should have the right to challenge designations of their property.  It 
finds that comprehensive local statutes, tailored to local constituency value 
judgments on property and burial rights, are the best way to protect these 
important rights while ensuring the procedural due process owed to each.  
I.  IS THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE LIMITED BY THE RIGHTS OF THE DEAD 
AND GRAVE TENDERS? 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process protects liberty and property from 
arbitrary government control.  Before reaching the inquiry of what 
procedure is necessary under the Due Process Clause, it is necessary to 
examine whether the grave-visitor’s liberty interest is significant enough to 
allow the Township to protect it by regulating Knick’s property.  
Municipalities are limited by the Due Process Clause to reasonable 
regulations of property justified by the police power to serve the public safety, 
health, and welfare of their communities.16  The following review shows that 
municipalities have several strong justifications for creating grave-
preservation laws notwithstanding their impact on private property rights. 
 
the plaintiff to seek compensation from the state exhausting the state procedures available.  
Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 
194 (1985).  Williamson County was reaffirmed in San Remo, which held that a state court’s decision 
that no taking exists in most cases precludes a federal court under federal law from reviewing the 
claim.  San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 338 (2005) (“Federal 
courts, moreover, are not free to disregard 28 U.S.C. § 1738 simply to guarantee that all takings 
plaintiffs can have their day in federal court.”).  Together these decisions prevented landowners 
who suffered a constitutional injury from seeking redress in federal court. 
 14 See generally Scott Twp. I, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146861, aff’d sub nom. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 862 
F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2017), vacated 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019). 
 15 Twp. of Scott, 862 F.3d at 314. 
 16 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). 
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The right to exclude is one of the most powerful and frequently used 
property rights.  It allows fee simple property owners to deny access to their 
property.  The right has been described by the Supreme Court as “one of the 
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized 
as property.”17  This right, however, is not limitless.  Several common law 
and statutory provisions limit the right to exclude.18  For instance, states can 
get warrants and make municipal inspections.  Relevant to Knick, a common-
law right has emerged in recent scholarship which recognizes the rights of 
the family of deceased to tend to the graves or grave sites of their ancestors.  
The Ninth Circuit has recognized a due-process right for parents to make 
“decisions dealing with death [of a child], such as . . . how to dispose of the 
remains.”19  Such a right is being codified in statutes across the country with 
serious implications for landowners and developers who may unknowingly 
be treading on abandoned grave sites.20  
An amicus brief was filed in Knick by several experts in the field of 
cemetery law arguing against Knick’s right to exclude persons from what 
they believe to be a cemetery on her property.21  They explain that, even 
without the statute put in place by Scott Township, any property with a 
burial ground on it is encumbered by rights in favor of the dead, the dead’s 
kin, and the public.22  They trace the different treatment of cemeteries as 
property back to Catholic Canon and Roman law.23  They also identify 
centuries of common law and more recently concocted statutes in the United 
States setting forth mechanisms for establishing cemeteries and cemetery 
rights different than other types of land.24  The most significant rights for the 
dead identified are those preventing disturbance or disinterment.25  They 
identify the supposed burial ground on Ms. Knick’s property as being a 
 
 17 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) (citing Kaiser Aetna 
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). 
 18 Katrina M. Wyman, The New Essentialism in Property, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 183, 201–03 (2017). 
 19 Marsh v. Cty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 20 See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 711.041(a) (2017) (“Any person who wishes to visit a 
cemetery or private burial grounds for which no public ingress or egress is available shall have the 
right to reasonable ingress and egress for the purpose of visiting the cemetery or private burial 
grounds”); 9 PA. CONS. STAT. § 703(b) (2017) (“The owner of a cemetery not owned by a cemetery 
company shall grant an individual reasonable ingress and egress to a burial plot in the cemetery for 
the purpose of visiting the burial plot.”). 
 21 Brief for Cemetery Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 
139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) (No. 17-647) [hereinafter Cemetery Law Scholars Brief]. 
 22 Id. at 4–5. 
 23 Id. at 6–7. 
 24 Id. at 7–8. 
 25 Id. at 11–12. 
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private, unregistered cemetery, the likes of which were used by families in 
America for centuries.26 
In support of the proposition favoring the rights of the dead and their kin, 
the cemetery law experts’ brief cited several cases.27  One was the 1893 
California quiet-title case Stockton v. Weber, which concerned land that was 
established by deed as a cemetery and a family’s attempt to prevent its formal 
dedication.28  The Stockton court held for the family because condition 
precedents in the deed had not been met, and so the municipality could not 
acquire the cemetery.29  Another case cited was an Illinois condemnation 
case where a cemetery sued a railroad for taking their land and damaging 
the burial sites still held by them.30  The dispute was over the bounds of the 
cemetery, and the court noted that what establishes a cemetery is the act of 
separating the land, marking it, and distinguishing it as burial grounds.31  
Another was a Tennessee case where the court explicitly held that the owner 
of land containing a family burial plot must allow the family of the deceased 
reasonable access to the plot.32  One final noteworthy case was an early 
Supreme Court case over a Georgetown plot facing development.33  The 
Court noted grave sites at risk of disturbance must be protected by courts to 
respect the religious sensibilities of the dead where no other remedy at law 
exists.34  
There are two problems with the cases cited in the brief: none of them 
consider the problem ab initio of how grave sites are designated by 
government officials, and many of their propositions are not recognized by 
other courts.  A Colorado court has held that burial rights are best left to the 
general assembly, not common law.35  A Florida court noted that the rights 
conferred to kin are part of a bargain which requires upkeep of burial sites 
 
 26 Id. at 8. 
 27 Id. at 4–5. 
 28 Id. at 4.  It should be noted that the brief includes a parenthetical from Stockton v. Weber which cannot 
be found in that case but instead comes from a 1950 textbook.  See PERCIVAL JACKSON, THE LAW 
OF CADAVERS AND OF BURIAL AND BURIAL PLACES 187 (2nd ed. 1950) (“A single burial will entitle 
the interred cadaver to protection, and land containing a human being will be maintained 
inviolate.”). 
 29 Stockton v. Weber, 33 P. 332 (Cal. 1893).   
 30 Cemetery Law Scholars Brief at 5, Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (No.17-647). 
 31 Concordia Cemetery Ass’n v. Minn. & N.W.R. Co., 12 N.E. 536, 541 (Ill. 1887). 
 32 Hines v. State, 149 S.W. 1058, 1059 (Tenn. 1911). 
 33 Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. 566 (1829). 
 34 Id. at 584–85. 
 35 Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Morgan v. Kobobel, 176 P.3d 860, 864 (Colo. App. 2007). 
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to avoid risking abandonment and the relinquishment of those rights.36  For 
the cases cited, all refer to either established cemeteries or at the least 
cemeteries known to exist by the property owner.37  The scholars do not 
identify the type of easement sought or the rights that come with it.38  
Easements vary based on type and the rights of the parties involved can vary 
significantly.39  Some encumbrances can be abandoned, such as adverse 
possession.40  
A better parallel to property owners’ rights would be what happens when 
developers inevitably discover the buried dead when breaking ground.  
Finding bones under existing property is not uncommon and requires action 
of the property owner, not just to determine if a cemetery exists, but also to 
determine if it is possibly the site of a murder or a health risk.  Special issues 
arise in development because developers are not incentivized to respect the 
rights of the dead or their families: finding a grave creates regulatory and 
construction headaches which take time and money to overcome at the risk 
of (often justified) public outcry.  A West Virginia case where a developer 
plowed over headstones is an example of this ill treatment.41  A case in North 
Carolina was dismissed where the plaintiffs could not establish that the 
developers knew of a grave site and thus could not argue that they desecrated 
it.42  
If courts recognize the right of access to burial sites, states may be 
required to compensate the landowner if it enforces the right of way.  A 
taking of private property for public use must be compensated.43  In Knick, 
the amount of property at issue was of relatively little value, so the remedy 
sought was not monetary but an injunction against enforcement of the 
statute.44  Additionally, the state may resist compensation where the title is 
encumbered by the rights of those buried, descendants, and perhaps the 
 
 36 Mingledorff v. Crum, 388 So. 2d 632, 636 (Fla. App. 1980). 
 37 See generally Cemetery Law Scholars Brief, Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) (No. 17-
647). 
 38 Id. 
 39 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.02(2)(a), at 34-
13 (Matthew Bender & Co. 1997). 
 40 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.10, at 34-106, 
-108 (Matthew Bender & Co. 1997).  
 41 Gen. Pipeline Constr., Inc. v. Hairston, 765 S.E.2d 163, 167 (W. Va. 2014). 
 42 Robinson v. Forest Creek Ltd. P’ship, 712 S.E.2d 895, 898 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
 43 U.S. CONST. amend. V.; Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980) 
(“[A] State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without 
compensation . . . .”). 
 44 Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2168 (2019). 
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public generally.45  Some states have recognized an implied limitation on title 
of land which contains a graveyard.46  This is precisely the issue which 
prompted the dispute in Knick. 
Where a grave is known to exist, the law of many states provides a means 
of respecting the rights of parties involved.  Inventory surveys can identify 
graves in developments and most states have laws on the book for the 
procedure to relocate graves discovered in the process of archaeological 
surveys.47  In fact, under Pennsylvania law, Knick could possibly have 
accepted that the graves exist and sought to disinter the remains by seeking 
a disinterment permit.48  Such a situation, assuming the persons seeking 
access would dispute Knick’s right to disinter the remains, would be 
governed by common law and require the Orphan’s Court to determine 
whether Knick has any pressing reason for the remains to be disinterred.49  
However, the situation in Knick is not covered by these laws at this early stage 
in the litigation.  
The issue with a case like Knick is that it presents a chicken-or-the-egg 
problem.  Does Knick have the right to challenge the existence of a grave, or 
is the mere possibility that one exists sufficient to require more thorough 
investigation such as an archaeological survey?  The answer to this question 
has major implications for any property owner who may be the subject of a 
similar claim, whether it relates to graves or other items of cultural or 
historical significance.  The answer will depend on: whether a title is 
encumbered by the mere existence of a burial site; a state’s common law and 
statutory protections for grave sites; and the constitutional requirements 
relating to takings, searches and seizure, and the requirements of due process.  
 
 45 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). 
 46 See Cemetery Law Scholars Brief at 23, Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (No.17-647) (noting that a common 
law right to access property to visit relatives in cemeteries, characterized “as an implied easement 
in gross, is [ ] codified in about 20% of the states.”). 
 47 TANYA MARSH, THE LAW OF HUMAN REMAINS 21 (2016). 
 48 28 PA. CODE § 1.25 (2019). 
 49 See Novelli v. Carroll, 420 A.2d 469, 472–74 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (creating a seven-factor test 
weighing: (1) the degree of relationship that the party seeking reinterment bears to the decedent 
and the strength of that relationship; (2) the degree of relationship that the party seeking to prevent 
reinterment bears to the decedent; (3) the desire of the decedent, including the “general 
presumption that the decedent would not wish his remains to be disturbed,” or a specific statement 
of desire by the decedent; (4) “the conduct of the person seeking reinterment, especially as it may 
relate to the circumstances of the original interment;” (5) “the length of time that has elapsed since 
the original interment;” (6) the strength of the reasons offered in favor of and in opposition to 
reinterment; and (7) the appraisal of such balance of factors). 
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II.  WHAT PROCESS IS DUE WHEN LEGALLY ESTABLISHING GRAVES? 
States treat burial and property rights very differently as the area has only 
begun to be codified in the 20th century and no model code exists.50  Some 
states have no process in place to establish a burial ground, while some 
delegate the responsibility to courts or agencies.51  Most of the time there is 
little dispute that a grave is discovered when it becomes public knowledge.  
The concern here arises when there is a claim that a grave exists which is 
disputed by the property owner.  This problem has become exacerbated as 
grave information becomes more widely available through crowd-sourced 
websites like findagrave.com and increased public access to genealogical and 
historical resources.52 
Understanding that rights exist in burial sites, some might think that the 
best approach would be to entirely limit property rights where graves are 
found.  However, the basic notions of how our society works should not be 
ceded immediately when they are found to conflict with other rights.  
Millions of dollars and thousands of hours can go into a development, and at 
a certain point the public benefits to preserve and protect a long abandoned 
grave site become de minimis.  On the other hand, plenty of examples of 
desecrating and ignoring grave sites exist.53  For most cases, there is no hard 
rule that would protect both property and sacred rights.  Instead, processes 
need to be established that would allow neutral parties to determine 
appropriate outcomes for the unique situations that arise in this field of law. 
The Due Process Clause requires that, when the government takes 
property, the affected person have an opportunity to present their argument 
to protect their right at a hearing before a neutral body that has the ability 
to decide which right should prevail.54  The Court uses a balancing test to 
determine the requirements of due process in a given situation: the private 
 
 50 Tanya D. Marsh, When Dirt and Death Collide: Legal and Property Interests in Burial Places, 30 PROB. & 
PROP. 59, 59 (2016). 
 51  See generally MARSH, supra note 47. 
 52 See, e.g., FIND A GRAVE, https://www.findagrave.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2020) (allowing users 
to search memorials, grave records, and cemeteries); see also Cemetery Law Scholars Brief at 9, 
Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) (No.17-647) (citing to Find A Grave when listing the 
number of cemeteries listed in Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania). 
 53 See, e.g., Gen. Pipeline Constr. v. Hairston, 765 S.E.2d 163, 169–70, 174 (W. Va. 2014) 
(acknowledging that the jury found the defendants had desecrated a grave site but remanding on 
grounds of liability); Stephanie Farr & Jason Laughlin, “An Abominable Crime:” Investigation Underway 
into Toppled Headstones at Jewish Cemetery, PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 26, 2017), 
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/Cops-Report-of-vandalism-at-Jewish-cemetery.html. 
 54 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332‒35 (1976). 
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interest affected by the government interest and the value of additional 
procedures in guarding against erroneous deprivations of that interest versus 
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional procedures would 
impose upon the government.55  Due process generally requires at a 
minimum: notice, the opportunity to be heard, and a fair and balanced trier 
of fact.56  Due process functions to ensure government decisions are made 
correctly and efficiently.  It allows the person affected to argue about how 
the rules are being applied in a particular instance, and it protects the dignity 
of the person affected by the rules.57  In the property context, a court has the 
power to strike down laws targeting a particular property or transferring 
private property from one private party to another without reasonable 
police-power motivations.58 
In Knick, a private party claimed that they had a right to access a property 
and that right was vested in the nature of the property, which could only be 
verified by intrusion onto the property.  The landowner denied that claim, 
and a dispute arose which involved the rights of the person to visit and tend 
the supposed grave and the landowner to their property.  Scott Township’s 
ordinance and some others presume the existence of a cemetery, but the 
property owner must have the opportunity to deny that claim, otherwise the 
state may arbitrarily intrude on property rights without any measure of 
protection. 
There are several methods that states use to allow families to access their 
ancestors’ graves on private property.  The primary means are private 
enforcement by the family petitioning the court under state statute, or state 
action to preserve historic grounds.  Having established three interests in the 
property at stake: that of the owner, the dead, and the descendants, each 
must be at least minimally protected under the Due Process Clause.  There 
are several existing procedures in place which protect these rights, but the 
existence of a grave is often assumed to be known for a fact before hearings 
take place, which makes those procedures wholly inadequate for the 
circumstances at issue in Knick. 
 
 55 Developments in the Law, Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1505–08 (1978) (citing Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 56 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349–50.  
 57 See Developments in the Law, supra note 55, at 1505 (1978). 
 58 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (“[W]hen, if ever, the provisions set 
forth in the ordinance in tedious and minute detail, come to be concretely applied to particular 
premises, including those of the appellee, or to particular conditions, or to be considered in 
connection with specific complaints, some of them, or even many of them, may be found to be 
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.”). 
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A.  Private Enforcement 
1.  Statute 
Every state has laws and regulations pertaining to the establishment and 
maintenance of cemeteries.59  These laws ensure that graves are created with 
respect for the dead and maintained while the cemetery is still in operation.  
Usually restrictions are placed on disinterment such as requiring family 
approval or abandonment of the grave.60  Recently, several states have 
passed statutes protecting the right to visit existing graves, putting into statute 
what may have been enforceable only under common law or contractual 
rights previously.61 
A remarkably similar case to Knick arose in West Virginia where a family 
claimed to have ancestors buried on another’s private property in unmarked, 
then-unknown graves.62  West Virginia law covers the rights of visitation to 
grave sites.63  However, the family had no evidence besides “inadmissible 
hearsay” to establish the site of the graves.64  The court therefore did not 
allow their petition to visit the sites or establish a monument to move forward, 
and was willing to consider the defendant landowner’s counterclaim for 
trespass.65  The law provides the right to “authorized” persons to request 
access from the landowner, and if refused, gives them a right to petition the 
court to enjoin the landowner from refusing access to the site.66  As occurred 
in Blankenship, the court then has to determine whether the petitioner is an 
“authorized” person which requires determining whether a grave exists in 
the first place.67  This provides the landowner with the opportunity to present 
arguments: against the existence of a cemetery, against the petitioner for not 
following the statute’s notice provisions, and potentially for violating trespass 
 
 59 See generally MARSH, supra note 47. 
 60 Aaron H. Midler, Note, The Spirit of NAGPRA: The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
and the Regulation of Culturally Unidentifiable Remains, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1331, 1335 (2011). 
 61 See, e.g., 9 PA. CONS. STAT. § 703 (2017) (“The owner of a cemetery not owned by a cemetery 
company shall grant an individual reasonable ingress and egress to a burial plot in the cemetery for 
the purpose of visiting the burial plot.”); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 711.041 (2017) (“Any 
person who wishes to visit a cemetery or private burial grounds for which no public ingress or egress 
is available shall have the right to reasonable ingress and egress for the purpose of visiting the 
cemetery or private burial grounds.”).  
 62 Blankenship v. Mendelson, No. 11-1136, 2012 W. Va. LEXIS 474, at *1–2 (W. Va. June 22, 2012). 
 63 Id. at *3; W. VA. CODE § 37-13A-1 (2019). 
 64 Blankenship, 2012 W.Va. LEXIS 474, at *3. 
 65 Id. 
 66 W. VA. CODE §§ 37-13A-1 to -7 (2019). 
 67 Id. 
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or other criminal laws in attempting to gain access to the property without 
their or the court’s approval.  
Pennsylvania, the state where Knick occurred, passed a similar bill 
protecting the right to access graves in 2017.68  The statute had provisions 
requiring landowners to allow grave visitation, but gave landowners the 
opportunity to limit access.  If a person was denied access, the statute granted 
them the right to petition a court for an injunction.69  No opinions have been 
published yet referencing this statute, but if judges similarly require the 
petitioner to prove the grave exists and give the landowner the opportunity 
to deny its existence, the requirements of due process will be met.  However, 
yet to be resolved under such a statute would be Knick’s takings and unlawful 
search claims.  The grave scholars argue that title to a property with a grave 
on it is subject to an encumbrance in favor of the rights of the dead, the kin 
of the dead, and the public.70  These rights include the prevention of the 
landowner from removing or disturbing the grave, relatives and friends 
having access to visit and care for the graves, limiting the use of the property 
to cemetery purposes, and limiting the owner from changing or removing 
land set aside to be a cemetery.71  
2.  Common Law 
There are also common-law rights of kin to the protection of their 
ancestors in some jurisdictions.  These include actions in tort for 
desecration.72  Louisiana, for example, finds that once graves are marked as 
such, rights are established and property owners cannot exclude those who 
wish to visit graves.73  These rights are becoming memorialized more 
frequently in statute, preempting the use of common law to enforce them.  
Because dead bodies are not regarded as property, many courts do not allow 
civil suits for damages done to them.74  Although most courts recognize the 
 
 68 9 PA. CONS. STAT. § 703 (2017). 
 69 Id. § 703(b), 703(g).  
 70 Cemetery Law Scholars Brief at 4–5, Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) (No.17-647). 
 71 Vidrine v. Vidrine, 225 So. 2d 691, 697 (La. Ct. App. 1969). 
 72 Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 240 (Minn. 1891) (“[I]t would be a reproach to the law if a plaintiff’s 
right to recover for mental anguish resulting from the mutilation or other disturbance of the remains 
of his dead should be made to depend upon whether in committing the act the defendant also 
committed a technical trespass upon plaintiff’s premises, while everybody’s common sense would 
tell him that the real and substantial wrong was not the trespass on the land, but the indignity to 
the dead.”). 
 73 Thomas v. Mobley, 118 So. 2d 476, 478 (La. Ct. App. 1960). 
 74 See Marsh, supra note 50, at 15. 
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right of kin to control the burial (absent the dead’s wishes otherwise), only 
some recognize the right of preservation of the deceased.75  Once buried, 
American law protects the site of the grave in perpetuity.76  
The brief of the Cemetery Law Scholars in Knick identifies a common-
law right to access graves.77  It cites cases in which parties sue in tort for 
damages from restriction of access, including a 1940 Louisiana case which 
awards damages for mental anguish due to intentional disturbance of a grave 
by the owner of the land in which the grave sat.78  Contract law can also 
provide remedies where plots are purchased in cemeteries, but that is of 
course irrelevant here.79  A system could be devised to enforce access to 
graves in this manner.  As in an action in tort, property owners would be 
given full ability to argue their defense including whether or not a grave exists 
in the first instance.  This would ensure that the due-process rights of the 
landowner are protected.  The court could be given the power to examine 
the site of the alleged burial to determine whether or not a grave exists upon 
some showing of evidence of its existence.  The difficulty would be that the 
landowner would have to prove that something does not exist, so some 
burden would have to be placed on the petitioner to show strong evidence of 
the grave’s existence, and perhaps a court allowance of discovery on the 
defendant’s land.  Since it is not clear whether most states would support an 
action of this kind, and the results of common law actions can be 
incongruous, legislative action is more appropriate to create a cause of 
action.80  
If a state recognizes such rights, there must be some limiting principle, 
otherwise the whole world will become a cemetery.  As discussed above, the 
common-law rights to visit graves are not uniform among the states.81  In 
order to claim privileges regarding a cemetery, burdens should be placed 
upon a family to maintain it in order to limit the damage to the property 
owner.  Eventually, unless social customs regarding distant ancestors 
 
 75 Id. at 9, 15.  
 76 Id. at 11. 
 77 Cemetery Law Scholars Brief at 14, Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) (No.17-647). 
 78 Id. at 19–20 (citing Humphreys v. Bennett Oil Corp., 197 So. 222, 229–30 (La. 1940)). 
 79 Midler, supra note 60, at 1333. 
 80 Additionally, many of the cases that do support grave-desecration tort suits require close relation to 
the deceased for standing.  See id. at 1333–34 (“Today, the availability of civil remedies for the 
desecration of a corpse or grave largely depends upon whether a potential plaintiff can satisfy the 
legal definition of ‘next of kin.’”). 
 81 Marsh notes that European practice is to disinter bones after decomposition and reuse the empty 
graves, a practical solution to this problem.  Marsh, supra note 50, at 11. 
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dramatically change, the dead will be forgotten by their descendants and so 
will the graves.  Abandonment is used in some jurisdictions to deal with this 
problem.  In those jurisdictions, abandoned graves and the kin of the 
deceased within them receive less protection than graves that have been 
maintained.82  
A Texas case provides an illustration of why the law should limit the 
rights of descendants as such.  A gas-processing facility was bought in 1955 
subject to a reservation in the deed that the cemetery existing on the land 
remain for that purpose for as long as it was used as such.83  The cemetery 
had in the six decades since been abandoned by families tending their dead.84  
The buyers tended the cemetery and did not disturb it so long as it did not 
interfere with their gas processing.85  When the day came that the buyers 
needed the cemetery to be moved and the bodies disinterred, a descendant 
of the seller intervened to demand the cemetery remain.86  The seller’s 
descendant was successful because, by tending the cemetery, the buyers had 
made it so the site was not “abandoned” and the bodies therein could not be 
disinterred under Texas law.87  Abandoned graves will be left to the property 
owner to deal with, and their actions will still be limited by laws protecting 
the rights of the dead, but the distant relatives will no longer have the ability 
to come back decades or centuries later to require landowners to enforce 
rights that were long ago abandoned.  Knick would be an obvious  case of 
abandonment because there is no evidence that the graves had been tended, 
much less even known about, for the duration of Knick’s ownership of the 
property.  That raises additional questions, the answers to which may change 
the effect of abandonment, such as to what extent graves lose protection by 
abandonment, and whether the right of access vests in the kin or the public 
generally. 
B.  Historic Preservation 
Historical designation is another method municipalities use to respect the 
rights of the dead and their ancestors.  Designation is the process whereby 
land is restricted from certain types of development and use in order to 
respect its historical significance.  Such designations are used by local 
governments to maintain a historical character of a neighborhood or protect 
 
 82 A. F. Hutchinson Land Co. v. Whitehead Bros., 218 A.D. 682, 684–85 (N.Y. App. Div. 1926). 
 83 Levandovsky v. Targa Res. Inc., 375 S.W.3d 593, 595 (Tex. App. 2012). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 598. 
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a historical landmark.  A heavy-handed approach can have negative 
economic consequences, and a too lax approach will lead to desirable sites 
being destroyed.  In the context of cemeteries, local governments may decide 
to preserve a cemetery because a famous person is buried there, or because 
the cemetery itself is significant to the beauty or history of the community.  
There are several federal laws which protect American cultural resources.  
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 2010 
(“NAGPRA”) was established to protect native remains from desecration 
and return the remains from public to tribal control.88  The National Historic 
Preservation Act of 1966 (“NHPA”) allows the National Park Service 
(“NPS”) to designate sites worthy of preservation.89  NHPA allows claims to 
be heard by the NPS where a petitioner believes that an activity may damage 
a site of cultural significance, while NAGPRA allows native tribes to claim 
the remains of ancestors if they can prove they originate from the same 
tribe.90 
These preservation statutes can and often are applied to cemeteries.  
Hawaii has a unique system which finds the balance in favor of the rights of 
the descendants, giving standing to challenge development on burial sites 
under the Hawaiian Constitution to all descendants of the islands’ natives.91  
Hawaii requires an Archaeological Inventory Survey to be completed for 
each project that may disturb historic property or a burial site.92  Challenges 
may also be filed by private parties against developments claiming 
disturbance to cultural resources.93  Upon receiving such a challenge, the 
Department of Land and Natural Resources, Historic Preservation Division 
and the Burial Council determine if the land should be designated as a burial 
site.94  If land is designated, the remains cannot be disinterred and moved to 
another site without approval of the Historic Preservation Division and 
Burial Council.95  These decisions can be appealed.96  The system also 
 
 88 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 2010 (NAGPRA), Pub. L. No. 101-
601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–13); see also Midler, supra note 60, at 1332 
(describing the Act’s protection of native burials). 
 89 National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (1966) (codified at 54 
U.S.C. § 100101). 
 90 Midler, supra note 60, at 1332.  
 91 Kaleikini v. Thielen, 237 P.3d 1067, 1092 (Haw. 2010). 
 92 Hall v. Dep’t of Land & Nat. Res., 290 P.3d 525, 527 (Haw. Ct. App. 2012). 
 93 HAW. STATE HISTORIC PRES. DIV., SUMMARY OF HAWAII BURIAL LAWS 3 (2015), available at 
https://dlnr.hawaii.gov/shpd/files/2015/06/SUMMARY-OF-HAWAII-BURIAL-LAWS.pdf. 
 94 Id. at 7. 
 95        Id. at 10–13.  
 96 Id. at 3. 
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requires an Archaeological Inventory Survey to be completed before 
construction begins, much like environmental impact statements.97  The 
strong burial beliefs of the native Hawaiian people and the resulting 
frequency of archaeological sites, especially due to the islands’ long history 
and small land area, led the state  to weigh burial rights more heavily than 
those of landowners.98  
Philadelphia lies at the other end of the spectrum, having archaeological 
and burial protection laws on the books but not always enforcing them.  A 
developer uncovered coffins in the city in 2017 and city officials refused to 
seek designation of the spot as one of archaeological interest.99  Instead, the 
developer worked with private archaeologists to excavate the site and sought 
permission from the Orphan’s Court to move the remains to another burial 
site.100  The Orphan’s Court then assumed supervision of the exhumation 
which took several months and uncovered over four hundred bodies.101  This 
was a successful resolution where the developer was willing to work with the 
city and public.102  However, the months of delay likely cost a significant 
amount of money, and there are few incentives for developers to act this way 
except out of human decency and archaeological curiosity. 
In 2018, construction of a public school unearthed ninety-five graves 
dating from the late nineteenth century in Sugar Land, Texas.103  Local 
officials decided to continue building a school and to remove the bodies to a 
separate cemetery.104  Texas law requires reporting any “unverified 
cemetery” to the Texas Historical Commission, which must determine 
whether a cemetery exists and the appropriate steps to take to preserve the 
 
 97 A Brief Historical Overview of Burial Issues, KAMAKAKO’I, https://www.kamakakoi.com/a-brief-
historical-overview-of-burial-issues/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2020). 
 98       Id. 
 99 Stephan Salisbury, Bones From 407 Human Skeletons Tallied in Court Report on Arch Street Building Site, 
PHILA. INQUIRER (Oct. 30, 2017), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/pennsylvania/phila
delphia/bones-arch-street-construction-site-pmc-orphans-court-20171030.html.  
 100 Id. 
 101 Id.  
 102 Coincidentally, the bones existed at the site because a nineteenth-century order from the Orphan’s 
Court to relocate the bones was not completed. Stephan Salisbury, Judge Wants to Know What 
Developer Intends To Do With Arch Street Bones, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 24, 2017), 
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/pennsylvania/philadelphia/developer-seeking-court-approv
al-to-remove-burials-from-arch-street-site-20170724.html.  
 103 Charly Edsitty, ‘We Must be Careful’ Bodies of Nearly 100 Slaves to Stay at FBISD Construction Site for Now, 
ABC13 NEWS (Nov. 19, 2018), https://abc13.com/society/bodies-of-nearly-100-slaves-to-stay-at-
fbisd-construction-site-/4718036/.  
 104 Id. 
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site or exhume the bodies.105  The statute requires the landowner give 
consent before any historical commission search of the property.106  A Texas 
court must remove the dedication of an existing but abandoned cemetery or 
allow exhumation of bodies in an abandoned or unknown cemetery if the 
landowner petitions the court and the court finds it is in the public interest to 
do so.107  Texas additionally does not allow persons an egress over private 
land to unverified cemeteries as it does to dedicated cemeteries.108 
The Federal Government will sometimes get involved in the discovery of 
a burial ground if it has significant ties to the history and culture of our nation 
as a whole.  In 1991, a large cemetery of over 15,000 Africans dating to the 
seventeenth century was discovered in Manhattan during the construction of 
a federal office building.109  Due to a requirement that federally funded 
development comply with certain preservation and archaeological 
requirements, the site was discovered and preserved.110  The site is now a 
National Historic Landmark and open to the public to learn about the history 
of slavery in New York City.111  This is a rare case where the government is 
directly involved in construction and the site itself is of significance to the 
community as a whole and not a single family.  The outcome is justified by 
both of the foregoing but also by the reliance of federally funded construction 
on federal dollars and the responsibilities that come with using that money.  
The methods of determining if a cemetery exists at the outset could be 
reviewed by administrative bodies such as preservation commissions.  Due 
to their quasi-judicial nature, courts would hold that due-process rights 
should be more tailored to the situation than would be due in court.112  At a 
bare minimum, the landowner would certainly have a right to present their 
argument before a neutral body.  However, courts may take less seriously a 
 
 105 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 711.001–.084 (2013). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 History & Culture, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/afbg/learn/historyculture/index.htm 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2020). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id.  
 112 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (finding that procedural due-process 
requirements were met in an administrative hearing for Social Security disability benefits tailored 
to accommodate the extent of benefits awarded, in comparison to welfare benefit recipients); 
Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v. Sullivan, 953 P.2d 1315, 1342–43 (Haw. 1998) (holding 
that a zoning board’s refusal to allow cross-examination of witnesses does not violate due process 
because it is harmless). 
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challenge to a biased board or a refusal to allow a property owner to use 
certain litigation devices such as calling witnesses or cross-examination.113 
As shown above, many states are beginning to effect by statute means of 
dealing with latent burial sites on private property.  Statutes provide the most 
effective means of handling these situations because they provide clear 
guidelines at the outset for how parties should understand their rights.  The 
issue in Knick could be resolved if the Township had a procedure in place for 
determining the existence of a grave without arbitrary designation.  
Addressing this issue through statutes is preferable to allowing courts to 
conjure incomprehensible multi-factor tests that attempt to balance the rights 
of the parties because positive laws lower the risk of incongruous results and 
needless litigation.  State and local legislatures need to implement laws that 
respect the access right appropriately for their constituencies.  If they do not, 
Knick-type litigation is inevitable and will leave one side feeling their rights 
unvindicated in every case.  
These statutes vary in important ways to reflect different constituencies’ 
valuing of property rights and visitation rights.  Texas requires a state 
commission to get involved when the existence of an unmarked grave is 
claimed, but officials cannot search without an owner’s consent.114  West 
Virginia on the other hand has a court resolve the matter of whether a grave 
exists, and has no statutory restrictions on the court’s ability to possibly allow 
a party to complete a historical survey.115  Pennsylvania makes no mention 
of unmarked or undiscovered graves in its statute at all.116  A statute should 
clearly establish what the rights are of the landowner and the petitioner, what 
standard shall be used in determining whether a grave exists, to what extent 
parties may investigate the land, and what body is responsible for hearing the 
case.  The statutory rights may include provisions strongly favoring the 
landowner such as in Texas, or the rights of the community and petitioners 
such as in Hawaii.  The standard will likely be a burden on the petitioner to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a grave exists.  However, the 
burden could shift, and the standard could change depending on what values 
a state holds more closely.  The practical effect of this standard will also be 
strongly influenced by the leeway of discovery given to the petitioning party.  
For instance, in Texas, although a party may petition to establish a cemetery, 
 
 113 See, e.g., Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (tolerating less strict procedural due-process requirements in 
certain circumstances); Korean Buddhist Temple, 953 P.2d at 1342–43. 
 114 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 711.001–.084 (2013). 
 115 W. VA. CODE § 37-13A-1 to -7 (2019). 
 116 2017 Pa. Laws 64. 
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that right is fully contingent on the landowner’s consent to the historical 
commission to access the property.  
CONCLUSION 
States and municipalities fashion solutions to the issue of abandoned and 
unmarked graves that fit their unique needs.  Hawaii’s extensive review 
process would be cumbersome in most places, but their limited land and 
unique culture require a different approach than in most other places.  Texas 
has landed squarely on the side of landowners, requiring their permission for 
any investigation of their land.  For Scott Township and Knick, the 
resolution probably lies somewhere in between.  Colonial-era farmlands are 
bound to be laden with family plots, and the respect they are due demands 
concessions from landowners.  Scott Township’s error was ignoring the 
process altogether.  The Township decided whether the graves existed 
without giving Knick any say in the matter, denying her the due process  
necessary in creating a system where all parties and the public feel that they 
have a say. 
States are likely the best forum for enforcing these laws because of their 
ability to tailor laws to their unique cultural and religious needs.  As noted 
above, Hawaii is going to have very different needs than Pennsylvania.  
Federal law will have to protect Native burial grounds and cemeteries on 
federal land, but laws that cover the whole country run the risk of being 
underinclusive of plots that matter to individual families.  Additionally, courts 
are going to be more protective of due-process rights than administrative 
bodies.  This should guide advocates who wish to protect property rights to 
counterintuitively accept statutes protecting rights of way with limits and for 
the benefit of the property owners because an administrative agency may not 
be as generous as the legislature and their right to present their case should 
they disagree with a decision would be much more limited. 
